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SequentialPhases and Contrasting
Structures in Exchange Control Regimes
Thepreceding chapter analyzed taxonomically, with several illustrations from
the country studies in the Project, the numerous dimensions on which ex-
change control regimes can, and do, differ from one another in their use of
both QRs and price instruments. In the present chapter, we now shift the focus
of our analysis to two sets of questions about exchange control regimes or,
more broadly, foreign trade regimes, regarded as integrated structures or
''clusters'':
(1) Can we state any general propositions about the economic conse-
quences of different exchange control regimes?
(2) Can we delineate certain basic "types" or stages of exchange control
regimes in a manner that is economically meaningful for analyzing the time se-
quencing of the regimes within a country and across countries?
I. GENERAL PROPOSITIONS
The analysis of exchange control regimes and their consequences in the dif-
ferent country studies reflects and underscores three basic propositions that
may now be stated and briefly discussed.
Proposition (1):Identical component features of exchange control
regimes have, generally speaking, differential economic consequences if the
exchange control regime is dissimilar on other dimensions.
Proposition (2): The economic consequences of an identical exchange
control regime will, generally speaking, vary with differences in the structure
of domestic objectives and attendant policies.
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Proposition (3): Alternative exchange control regimes have, generally
speaking, different economic consequences.
A. Proposition (1)
The differential effects of identical component features of exchange control
regimes, arising from differences in the regimes on other dimensions, may be
briefly spelled out here by reference to specific examples.
1. NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF LICENSES.
The effects of non-transferability of import licenses clearly depend on the
exact structure of the exchange control regime. Thus, in India, where the non-
transferability rules had been carried to the utmost extreme such that firms
could not legally sell import licenses or imports, the adverse effects via the
creation of bottlenecks were progressively blunted as the regime was
amended—as part of moves in the direction of export subsidization—to allow
for growing numbers of import entitlement schemes under which eligible ex-
porters retained varying fractions of their export earnings for their own use.
This was also the effect of the introduction of the export bonus voucher
scheme in Pakistan. Under both schemes, the regime enabled the importation
of items fetching high premiums and hence reflecting critical bottlenecks and
shortages.
2. ITEMWISE SPECIFICATION OF LICENSES.
Yet another illustration of Proposition (1) is afforded by the itemwise
specification of import licenses. If such specification is combined with the
sourcewise specification of licenses, then the effect is equivalent to that of ef-
fective "double-tying" of aid. The results, in. terms of the additional expense
of importing the specified items via exercise of monopolistic power by sup-
pliers,are correspondingly more probable. By contrast, mere itemwise
specification of importable items, with the sources of origin left open, need
not cause monopolistic pricing by suppliers because it would always be possi-
ble to switch sources and thereby introduce competition among suppliers.
B. Proposition (2)
We now turn to the proposition that identical exchange control regimes will, in
general, lead to different consequences depending on the structure of domestic
policies with which they operate. This is ideally illustrated by the following ex-
ample.GENERAL PROPOSITIONS 55
INTERACTIONWITH INDUSTRIAL LICENSING.
The allocation of imported intermediates, on a pro rata basis related to
capacity installed in an industry, is an occasional feature of the import-
licensing regimes, as noted in Chapter 2. However, itisclear that its
deleterious effects on competition, for example, are seriously aggravated if it is
combined with domestic industrial licensing (in pursuit of economic objectives
such as the regulation of the pattern of investment or of non-economic objec-
tives such as the control of concentration of economic power).
Thus, in India and to some extent in Pakistan, the pro rata to capacity
allocations of imported materials would have blunted competition in any event
by giving existing firms "equal, guaranteed access" to the imported inputs
regardless of their efficiency. In the marketplace, however, without this regime
these firms would have had to compete for this access, and the inefficient firms
would have been at a disadvantage.' But given the strict industrial licensing of
both expansion by existing firms and investment by new firms, within overall
targets, the effect was to reduce "potential" competition by entry to negligible
levels. Not merely could the more efficient existing firms not drive out the less
efficient ones but free entry was not possible by new firms either. In addition,
foreign competition was ruled out by a policy of automatic protection. Hence
the total effect was virtually to eliminate effective competition except in in-
dustries that had happened to overexpand by miscalculation of the planners
and the investors.
C.Proposition(3)
Having noted briefly the interaction effects between (1) the different com-
ponents of an exchange control regime and (2) the exchange control regime
and domestic policies, we may finally address a few remarks to the simpler fact
that differences in exchange control regimes will generally result in differential
consequences. It should suffice to draw attention to one pointed illustration.
PRO RATA ALLOCATIONS OF MATERIALS.
Thus, a regime that makes allocations of imported materials to firms pro
rata to installed capacity, as was the case in Pakistan and India, will have con-
sequences such as the creation of a bias toward expanding capacity in the face
of underutilized capacity.2 It will also affect the structure of incentives among
different industries for expansion, thus implying differential resource alloca-
tional effects, depending for example on the rate at which such pro rata alloca-
tions are made in the different industries.3 If, however, the allocations were to
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of exchange auctions (as in Brazil after 1953) or the use of traders/importers
who then earn the import premium rather than the producers, these effects
would be eliminated and different consequences would follow.5
II. SEQUENTIAL PATTERNS AND PHASES
The foregoing general propositions can be supplemented by more specific
delineation of exchange control regimes into certain basic types or, what we
term, Phases that have a broadly differentiated impact on economic efficiency
and performance.6
This notion of Phases, shortly to be defined but essentially based on the
restrictionist content and associated blend of control and price instruments,
reflected initial familiarity with the evolving exchange control regimes in
specific countries' and the strongly suggested hypothesis that these regimes
went through a sequencing. In the analytical framework that defined the broad
contours of the country studies in the Project, this notion of sequencing was
sharpened and spelled out in the shape of alternative Phases in the exchange
control regime. These Phases in the exchange control regimes were designed
essentially as a classificatory and descriptive device to capture meaningfully
the evolution of the exchange control system in terms of its restrictionist con-
tent and the dimensions and pattern of its use of control and price instruments.
The analytical framework distinguished among five Phases. The exchange
control regimes in the countries in the Project were to be traced through, plac-
ing them in one of these Phases at a point in time.8 It was expected that the
resulting patterns would also be highly suggestive of hypotheses concerning the
success or failure of attempts at liberalization, hypotheses that are considered
explicitly in the companion volume by Krueger.
A. Phase I
This Phase is characterized by the systematic and significant imposition of
quantitative controls. It might start in response to an unsustainable payments
deficit resulting from intense or sustained prior inflationary pressure (due, for
example, to the initiation of a large-scale development plan and consequent ex-
traordinary increases in government expenditures) or from a sharp drop in
world prices for some major exports (as in 1953). These reasons for instituting
controls are of interest in ascertaining the logic of the evolution of exchange
control regimes but are not critical to the definition of Phase I.
Throughout Phase I (which, of course, can be of varying duration), con-
trols are generally maintained and often intensified. This continuation or in-
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continuation of initial controls might be necessary to contain an ex ante, un-
sustainable payments deficit; (2) the initial set of controls might result in eva-
sions of the system through illegal transactions that negate any possible impact
on the balance of payments; (3) once controls are instituted, policy-makers
may perceive the new instruments as handy for a variety of purposes in addi-
tion to controlling the payments situation and begin employing them for such
purposes; and (4) policy-makers may perceive their actions as freed from a
balance of payments constraint and adopt policies that in fact require restric-
tiveness afresh to offset further adverse effects on the balance of payments.
B. Phase II
This Phase is characterized by continued reliance upon quantitative restric-
tions and, indeed, generally increased restrictiveness of the entire control
system. However, Phase II is distinguished by two additional and related
aspects of the QR system, both relatively unimportant during Phase I: (1) for a
variety of reasons, indicated below, the detailed workings of the control
system become increasingly complex; and (2) price measures are adopted to
buttress the functioning of the control system. Both of these characteristics of
Phase II stem from dissatisfaction with the results of an undifferentiated
system and are often the result of many small decisions rather than an overall
policy design.
(1) Although neither term is quite appropriate, Phase I decision-making
and policies may be characterized as "crude" and "unsophisticated." Quan-
titative restrictions are applied with relatively few rules, and treatment of com-
peting claims to import licenses tends to be relatively undifferentiated in the
sense that rules for allocation tend to be of an "across the board" nature, such
as allocating to everyone a certain percentage of this person's imports over a
specified number of earlier years or allotting licenses pro rata with applica-
tions. The major motivation for changes in the control system during Phase I
is a concern with evasions, both legal and illegal, of the system. Thus, export
licensing may be adopted to ensure that exporters do not succeed in their at-
tempts at capital flight; controls over tourist and other invisible transactions
are aimed at preventing the emergence of a black market, and so on.
In Phase II, however, the rules of the regime have become more complex
and differentiated. The growth of the bureaucracy to administer the alloca-
tions and the inevitable tendency to differentiate increasingly among alter-
native end uses and claimants as the control regime is perceived to be a contin-
uing state of affairs interact to produce a complex system (whose possible
dimensions ought to be generally evident to the reader from Chapter 2).
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measures to supplement the QR regime. This generally occurs with respect to
both exports and imports. The continuation or intensification of foreign ex-
change shortage leads to recognition that additional export earnings would be
desirable. Rebate schemes, import replenishment schemes, special credits for
exporters, and a variety of other devices may be instituted that offset part or
all of the discrimination against exports implicit in an overvalued exchange
rate. Like the quantitative restrictions discussed above, however, export incen-
tives tend to be adopted in a piecemeal and fragmented fashion. As for im-
ports, price measures are also adopted to absorb part of the excess demand for
imports. Tariffs may be increased or surcharges added to the cost of import-
ing. Guarantee deposits are generally required on various categories of im-
ports. These and other measures tend to reduce (but hardly eliminate) the
windfall gain or premium accruing to the recipients of import licenses.
The following aspects of the price situation in Phase H are then evident:
(I) the exchange parity is "overlaid" by tariffs and subsidies, levied in lieu of
formal parity change; (2) the effective exchange rate for exports, on the
average, is rarely as high as the effective exchange rate on imports, implying a
bias against the (relative) incentive to export; (3) the domestic currency is over-
valued at the current parity plus trade tariffs and subsidies, implying a
premium (on the average) on imports; and (4)thisimport premium varies
across different activities, implying differential incentives to produce and in-
vest in these different activities.9
C. Phase III
Phase III is entered against the backdrop just defined, and it can take various
forms. It may consist of a mere "tidying-up" operation directed at replacing
the diverse import premiums by reasonably uniform tariffs such that the dif-
ferential incentive effects caused by diverse premiums on different imports are
greatly reduced or virtually eliminated. Alternatively, the tidying-up operation
may replace the existing tariffs and export subsidies with a formal parity
change, the result being that the (average) effective exchange rates on exports
and imports do not change much but the dispersion of tariffs is replaced by the
uniform devaluation—an action again of rationalization in this instance. On
the other hand, Phase III may be substantially ambitious and take the form of
what might be described as a devaluation cum liberalization package. Such a
package may have a gross devaluation large enough to leave a net devaluation
despite the removal of the trade tariffs and subsidies, with accompanying
grants by donors of additional credits to facilItate early expansion of imports,
debt rescheduling, and similar measures aimed at quick and easy liberalization
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D. Phase IV
Phase IV is entered when Phase III has resulted in continued liberalization.
This means that the average import premium has fallen, the bias against ex-
ports has substantially diminished (the effective exchange rate for exports hav-
ing come closer to the effective exchange rate for imports), and the degree of
dispersion in the incentives to expand different activities has diminished
through greater uniformity in these incentives via the foreign trade sector.
Needless to say, this outcome can only be anticipated from a Phase III
episode when the latter takes the ambitious form of a concerted effort of the
kind presupposed in a devaluation cum liberalization package. Even then, as is
documented in the companion Krueger volume, the outcome has often been a
reversion to Phase II. But the transition to Phase IV, which can be regarded as
the successful culmination of Phase III efforts, cannot be expected when
Phase III takes the form of a simple tidying-up operation, consisting of ra-
tionalization measures of the type already described above.
E. Phase V
The transition from Phase IV to Phase V occurs when the exchange regime is
virtually liberalized in the sense that there is full convertibility on current ac-
count and quantitative restrictions are not employed as a means of regulating
the balance of payments. Thus, an economy in Phase V is not an exchange
control regime in the usual sense of the term, and Phase V represents a total
alternative to the QR regimes of Phases I and II. The pegged exchange rate is
at its equilibrium level, a flexible exchange rate policy is in operation, or
monetary and fiscal policies are employed as the instruments to achieve•
payments balance in contrast to a reliance on the exchange control mechanism.
It will be evident shortly that Phase I has characterized the early ex-
perience with exchange control in nearly all the countries in the Project. In-
deed, it is no more than the period of entry into exchange control regimes of a
sustained variety. At the same time, Phase V turns out to have been more an
ideal than a reality even for the few countries (with the possible exception of
Israel) in the Project that have managed to transit from Phase II into seriously
sustained Phase III episodes and Phase IV.
III. PHASE EVOLUTION AND PATTERNS IN
COUNTRIES IN THE PROJECT
For each country in the Project, the delineation of Phases was undertaken. For
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to put these countries onto a common chart, Figure 3-1, which helps underline
possible patterns among the countries. In drawing conclusions, we need to
keep in mind that the delineation of Phases cannot be exact. Phase II, III, and
IV in particular are difficult to differentiate sharply. Hence it is wise to forego
the temptation to discuss questions such as the length of the periods under
each Phase in the different countries. Instead, the following points of interest
need to be made.
A. Patterns
Although the detailed Phase evolution is different for each country in the Pro-
ject, certain suggestive groupings are indicated. One group seems to have more
or less progressed through the Phases from Ito IV. This group contains Brazil,
Israel, and South Korea. Another group appears to have made repeated at-
tempts at Phase III episodes, which have not endured but rather been followed
by relapse into Phase II. The behavior of these countries is best described as
cycling back and forth mainly between Phases II, III, and IV and, rather rare-
ly, Phase I as well. The countries that clearly fall into this group are Chile and
Colombia. In a similar vein, Ghana and the Philippines seem to have gone
through one major such cycle and Turkey through two. Finally, there are the
countries that have generally been in Phase II over long-sustained periods with
rare (if any) jabs at Phase III episodes that were unsuccessful. The classic case
here is India, with Egypt falling neatly into the group before the nationaliza-
tions of the early 1960s (and after, if one construes the nationalization of
foreign trade as Phase II).
B. Discernible Trends
We may look at the Phase experiences from yet another angle by examining
trend differences during the period 1950-1972. A few observations are in
order.
One notices that Phase I is really an early form of exchange control regime
as a liberal regime is initially abandoned. It rarely seems to be a Phase to which
a regime at a later stage reverts, so that cycling through the Phases, for exam-
ple, generally bypasses Phase I altogether and is confined to Phases II, III, and
IV. Moreover, Phase V appears to have eluded most countries. The success
stories in the transition to a liberalized regime are mostly ones of transition to
Phase LV, as with South Korea and Brazil. Israel is the only exception to this
observation.
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(1) It is clear that, by the mid-1950s, there was practically no country (the
only exception being Ghana, which achieved independence in 1957 and joined
the ranks of restrictive regimes only in the early 1960s) that had not gone over
from a Phase V situation into Phase I or further into Phase II. Liberal trade
and payments regimes had thusvirtually become non-existent by the
mid- 1950s.'°
(2) Furthermore, during the latter half of the 1950s, fully half of the
countries studied appear to have remained in Phase II or Phase I type restric-
tive regimes. This was true of the Philippines, South Korea, India, Egypt, and
Brazil. Israel, however, had already made the transition to Phases III and IV,
and Chile, Colombia, and Turkey had taken steps in this direction.
(3) The 1960s were to witness substantially increased attempts at Phase III
type liberalization. In Brazil and South Korea this was to culminate in a suc-
cessful shift to Phase IV, with Israel managing to shift even to Phase V."
By and large, therefore, one might conclude that the decade of the fifties
was one of restrictive regimes in major part, and the decade of the sixties was
one of greater shift to more liberalized regimes. The analysis in the rest of this
volume is then addressed primarily to the issue whether the transition between
the 1950s and (especially) the late 1960s from exchange control regimes of the
Phase II variety—a phenomenon that is broadly evident from the country
studies in the Project, though not shared by those countries that had only
abortive Phase III episodes—was desirable from an economic viewpoint. Put
another way, our analysis will now be concerned with the question of the
economic impact of exchange control regimes of the Phase II type. This
analysis will naturally encompass some discussion of the alternative regimes
such as Phase IV. It will also attempt to distinguish, where appropriate, be-
tween different dimensions within the Phase II regimes.
NOTES
I. Similar blunting of competition would have occurred even under allocations based, for
example, on historical shares.
2. See the analysis in Chapter 5 below.
3. Cf. Bhagwati and Desai, op. cit., Chapter 17; also see Chapter 7 below.
4. For examples of this from the country studies, see Chapter 2.
5.Notealso that the distributional and political implications of these alternative regimes
would also be different: for example, the former would lead to more opposition by producers to
devaluations than the latter for the premium on imports would already have been lost to the pro-
ducers under the latter. These issues have been discussed in India,op.cit., and Turkey,op.cit.
6. Within each of the Phases to be defined, we must note that economically significant dif-
ferences may exist among some of the dimensions distinguished in Chapter 2: for example, in
Phase II,the QRs may be used to confer automatic protection or protection only within
prespecified limits of excess cost over c.i.f. values.NOTES 63
7.Thu.t, x'riting in 1968 with the Indian experience in mind, the present author had argued:
The typicalstagesin the transition of a less developed country, from one parity to
another, may be described as follows:
(1) Balance-of-payments difficulties, under a fixed parity, lead to the establishment
and frequently to the more or less permanent continuation of a regime of quantitative
restrictions. The result is the establishment of several ad hoc, defacto effective tariffs on
different activities—a set of multiple import rates. There also comes about a net export rate
(equal to parity) that falls below the effective import rates. (They exceed parity by the
premium on imports, which may vary between different imports if the exchange markets
are effectively segmented.) This export rate not only discriminates against exports but also
compounds the distortions that would arise from a multiplicity of rates on imports.
(2) Gradual shift towards a system of effective export subsidies occurs as the tight
balance-of-payments situation and the quantitative restrictions continue, in order to in-
crease export earnings. The effect is to reduce the differential between the export and the
import rates, while often leading to multiple rates on exports as well, since official subsidies
on exports almost always are discriminatory in practice.
(3) As the import premium continues, while lessened (celeris paribus) by the export
subsidization, governments turn gradually (under public criticism) to using tariffs more ac-
tively so as to cut into this premium and earn the scarcity profits themselves. The result is
that, with both export subsidies and import tariffs being used in this fashion, there comes
about a defacto devaluation on current visible transactions (extended gradually again to
invisibles, such as remittances from settlers abroad and tourist earnings, but practically
never to transactions on capital account).The de facto devaluation, however, is characterized
by numerous rates on imports and exports, and conceals effective export rates on specific
commodities that may exceed or fall below their effective import rates, so that numerous
distortions remain embedded in the system.
(4) As the realization grows that a defacto devaluation has occurred, in an inefficient
manner, the way is seen to rationalize the situation by devaluing the rate formally and
thereby managing to reduce, if not eliminate, the reliance on export subsidies and import
tariffs, though even this is done with considerable reluctance.
(5) Then the process can, and frequently does, start all over again, with the system of
quantitative restrictions again taking the brunt of initial adjustment and then gradually be-
ing eased by export subsidies and import tariffs.
There are several variations on this general sequence, of course. In place of a freer use
of import duties, for example, exchange auctions (as in Brazil) or multiplicity of exchange
rates, fixed directly by exchange-control authorities (in many Latin American countries),
have been used. Similarly, there are wide variations in the forms of export subsidy and the
manner in which selectivity is exercised in granting them.
See J. Bhagwati, The Theory and Practice of Commercial Policy, Frank Graham Memorial Lec-
ture (1967), Special Studies in International Economics, International Finance Section (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp.48-49.
8. Clearly, as will be evident below, identification of Phases must rest partly on judgments.
On the whole, however, the identification process has been bothrelatively uncomplicated and
fruitful.
9. See the appendix for the definition of effective exchange rate and other concepts (as well
as a summary description of Phases) at the end of the book.
10. In Chile, this had been so since the early 1930s! Cf. Chile, op. cit., pp. 21-27.
11. None of these countries, however, had dismantled the QR mechanism.